Philosophical Issues 29 (1):110-128 (2019)
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Abstract |
Having an etiological function to F is sufficient to have a competence to F. Having an etiological function to reliably F is sufficient to have a reliable competence, a competence to reliably F. Epistemic warrant consists in the normal functioning of the belief-forming process when the process has forming true beliefs reliably as an etiological function. Epistemic warrant requires reliable competence. Warrant divides into two grades. The first consists in normal functioning, when the process has forming true beliefs reliably as an etiological function, so that it reliably produces true beliefs when in normal conditions, but need not be in normal conditions. The second grade requires the first, and presence in normal conditions, so that the chance of true belief is high. Why is warrant normative? Because when reliably forming true beliefs is a function, both grades meet evaluative norms that follow from that function. The paper ends by comparing Tyler Burge’s answer to this question from "Perceptual Entitlement" and "Entitlement: The Basis of Empirical Warrant". It is argued that Burge’s answer implausibly presupposes that all belief-forming processes—not just those with forming reliably true beliefs as an etiological function—should form reliably true beliefs.
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Keywords | Reliabilism Epistemic Warrant Function Norm Reliability Demon-World Epistemic Justification Knowledge Evaluative Norm |
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DOI | 10.1111/phis.12142 |
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References found in this work BETA
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories.Ruth Garrett Millikan - 1984 - Behaviorism 14 (1):51-56.
Functions as Selected Effects: The Conceptual Analyst’s Defense.Karen Neander - 1991 - Philosophy of Science 58 (2):168-184.
A Virtue Epistemology: Apt Belief And Reflective Knowledge, Volume I. [REVIEW]Ernest Sosa - 2007 - Analysis 69 (2):382-385.
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Citations of this work BETA
Proper Functionalism and the Organizational Theory of Functions.Peter J. Graham - forthcoming - In Luis R. G. Oliveira (ed.), Externalism about Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Two Norms of Intention: A Vindication of Williamson’s Knowledge-Action Analogy.Frank Hofmann - 2021 - Acta Analytica 36 (4):1-10.
A Priori Perceptual Entitlement, Knowledge‐First.Mona Simion - 2020 - Philosophical Issues 30 (1):311-323.
Knowledge Norms of Belief and Belief Formation: When the Time is Ripe to Actualize One's Epistemic Potential.Frank Hofmann - 2021 - Ratio 34 (4):277-285.
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