Philosophical Issues 29 (1):110-128 (2019)

Peter Graham
University of California, Riverside
Having an etiological function to F is sufficient to have a competence to F. Having an etiological function to reliably F is sufficient to have a reliable competence, a competence to reliably F. Epistemic warrant consists in the normal functioning of the belief-forming process when the process has forming true beliefs reliably as an etiological function. Epistemic warrant requires reliable competence. Warrant divides into two grades. The first consists in normal functioning, when the process has forming true beliefs reliably as an etiological function, so that it reliably produces true beliefs when in normal conditions, but need not be in normal conditions. The second grade requires the first, and presence in normal conditions, so that the chance of true belief is high. Why is warrant normative? Because when reliably forming true beliefs is a function, both grades meet evaluative norms that follow from that function. The paper ends by comparing Tyler Burge’s answer to this question from "Perceptual Entitlement" and "Entitlement: The Basis of Empirical Warrant". It is argued that Burge’s answer implausibly presupposes that all belief-forming processes—not just those with forming reliably true beliefs as an etiological function—should form reliably true beliefs.
Keywords Reliabilism  Epistemic Warrant  Function  Norm  Reliability  Demon-World  Epistemic Justification  Knowledge  Evaluative Norm
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/phis.12142
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 71,464
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology.Duncan Pritchard - 2012 - Journal of Philosophy 109 (3):247-279.
Functions.Larry Wright - 1973 - Philosophical Review 82 (2):139-168.

View all 50 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Proper Functionalism and the Organizational Theory of Functions.Peter J. Graham - forthcoming - In Luis R. G. Oliveira (ed.), Externalism about Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
A Priori Perceptual Entitlement, Knowledge‐First.Mona Simion - 2020 - Philosophical Issues 30 (1):311-323.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

III—Normative Facts and Reasons.Fabienne Peter - 2019 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 119 (1):53-75.
Logical Properties of Warrant.Michael Huemer - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 122 (2):171-182.
Warrant is Unique.Andrew M. Bailey - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 149 (3):297-304.
Warrant Without Truth?E. J. Coffman - 2008 - Synthese 162 (2):173-194.
Virtue Ethics, Theory, and Warrant.Garrett Cullity - 1999 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 2 (3):277-294.
Plantinga-Warrant and Reliabilist Warrant.Jerome Gellman - 2014 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 18 (2):291.
Functions, Warrant, History.Peter J. Graham - 2014 - In Abrol Fairweather & Owen Flanagan (eds.), Naturalizing Epistemic Virtue. Cambridge University Press. pp. 15-35.
More on Warrant’s Entailing Truth.Trenton Merricks - 1997 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (3):627-631.
More on Warrant’s Entailing Truth.Trenton Merricks - 1997 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (3):627-631.
Warrant and Proper Function.Alvin Plantinga - 1993 - Oxford University Press.


Added to PP index

Total views
81 ( #144,948 of 2,520,426 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
4 ( #166,910 of 2,520,426 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes