Economics and Philosophy 22 (2):181-190 (2006)
This paper concerns voting with logical consequences, which means that anybody voting for an alternative x should vote for the logical consequences of x as well. Similarly, the social choice set is also supposed to be closed under logical consequences. The central result of the paper is that, given a set of fairly natural conditions, the only social choice functions that satisfy social logical closure are oligarchic (where a subset of the voters are decisive for the social choice). The set of conditions needed for the proof include a version of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives that also plays a central role in Arrow's impossibility theorem. (Published Online July 11 2006) Footnotes1 Much of this article was written while the author was a fellow at the Swedish Collegium for Advanced Study in the Social Sciences (SCASSS) in Uppsala. I want to thank the Collegium for providing me with excellent working conditions. Wlodek Rabinowicz and other fellows gave me valuable comments at a seminar at SCASSS when an early version of the paper was presented. I also want to thank Luc Bovens, Franz Dietrich, Christian List and an anonymous referee for their excellent comments on a later version. The final version was prepared during a stay at Oxford University for which I am grateful to the British Academy
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Citations of this work BETA
The Theory of Judgment Aggregation: An Introductory Review.Christian List - 2012 - Synthese 187 (1):179-207.
The Doctrinal Paradox, the Discursive Dilemma, and Logical Aggregation Theory.Philippe Mongin - 2012 - Theory and Decision 73 (3):315-355.
The Discursive Dilemma as a Lottery Paradox.Igor Douven & Jan-Willem Romeijn - 2007 - Economics and Philosophy 23 (3):301-319.
Group Communication and the Transformation of Judgments: An Impossibility Result.Christian List - 2011 - Journal of Political Philosophy 19 (1):1-27.
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