Philosophical Studies 174 (5):1163-1190 (2017)

Harvey Lederman
Princeton University
Hilary Greaves
Oxford University
An important objection to preference-satisfaction theories of well-being is that they cannot make sense of interpersonal comparisons. A tradition dating back to Harsanyi :434, 1953) attempts to solve this problem by appeal to people’s so-called extended preferences. This paper presents a new problem for the extended preferences program, related to Arrow’s celebrated impossibility theorem. We consider three ways in which the extended-preference theorist might avoid this problem, and recommend that she pursue one: developing aggregation rules that violate Arrow’s Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives condition.
Keywords Interpersonal well-being comparisons  Extended preferences  Preference-satisfaction theory  Theories of well-being
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-016-0748-6
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Interpersonal Comparisons with Preferences and Desires.Jacob Barrett - 2019 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 18 (3):219-241.
Can Subjectivism Account for Degrees of Wellbeing?Willem van der Deijl & Huub Brouwer - forthcoming - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice:1-22.

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