Philosophical Studies 167 (2):201-219 (2014)

Authors
Daniel Greco
Yale University
Abstract
In this paper I will present a puzzle about epistemic akrasia, and I will use that puzzle to motivate accepting some non-standard views about the nature of epistemological judgment. The puzzle is that while it seems obvious that epistemic akrasia must be irrational, the claim that epistemic akrasia is always irrational amounts to the claim that a certain sort of justified false belief—a justified false belief about what one ought to believe—is impossible. But justified false beliefs seem to be possible in any domain, and it’s hard to see why beliefs about what one ought to believe should be an exception. I will argue that when we get clearer about what sort of psychological state epistemic akrasia is, we can resolve the puzzle in favor of the intuitive view that epistemic akrasia is always irrational
Keywords Epistemology  Akrasia  Expressivism  Epistemic akrasia
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-012-0085-3
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References found in this work BETA

Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Brainstorms.Daniel C. Dennett - 1978 - MIT Press.

View all 46 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

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Epistemic Akrasia.Sophie Horowitz - 2014 - Noûs 48 (4):718-744.

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