In Gamlund and Solberg (ed.), Saving People from the Harm of Death. Oxford, USA: Oxford University Press (forthcoming)

Hilary Greaves
Oxford University
I argue that excessive reliance on the notion of “the badness of death” tends to lead theorists astray when thinking about healthcare prioritisation. I survey two examples: the confusion surrounding the “time-relative interests account” of the badness of death, and a confusion in the recent literature on cost-benefit analyses for family planning interventions. In both cases, the confusions in question would have been avoided if (instead of attempting to theorise in terms of the badness of death) theorists had forced themselves first to write down an appropriate value function, and then focused on the question of how to maximize value.
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Weighing Lives.John Broome - 2004 - Oxford University Press.
Population Axiology.Hilary Greaves - 2017 - Philosophy Compass 12 (11):e12442.
The Ethics of Killing: Problems at the Margins of Life.Frances Kamm - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (2):273-280.
Weighing Lives.Jacob Ross - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (4):663-666.

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