Broad and narrow epistemic standing: its relevance to the epistemology of disagreement
Synthese 197:1-18 (forthcoming)
Abstract
Epistemologists who have studied disagreement have started to devote attention to the notion of epistemic standing. One feature of epistemic standing they have not drawn attention to is a distinction between what I call “broad” and “narrow” epistemic standing. Someone who is, say, your broad epistemic peer with respect to some topic is someone who is generally as familiar with and good at handling the evidence as you are. But someone who is your narrow epistemic peer with respect to that topic is someone who is familiar with the evidence and as good at handling it as you are on that particular occasion. Thus, it’s possible for you to be my broad peer while also being my narrow inferior or superior. Attending to this distinction elicits different intuitions about some of the well-known cases in the epistemology of disagreement. Focusing on broad epistemic standing, which epistemologists have done, tends to yield conciliationist responses. But focusing on narrow epistemic standing, which epistemologists have not done, yields steadfast responses. The reason for this difference has to do with how we figure out someone’s broad or narrow epistemic standing: to determine her broad epistemic standing, you need to look at her epistemic traits and her familiarity with the evidence rather than to examine the evidence she gives. But to determine her narrow epistemic standing, you have to focus on her disclosed evidence rather than her epistemic traits or familiarity with the evidence.Author's Profile
DOI
10.1007/s11229-020-02573-8
My notes
Similar books and articles
Epistemic Self-Trust and Doxastic Disagreements.Fabienne Peter - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (6):1189-1205.
What is the Epistemic Significance of Disagreement?Noah Gabriel Martin - 2019 - Logos and Episteme 10 (3):283–298.
Peer disagreement under multiple epistemic systems.Rogier De Langhe - 2013 - Synthese 190 (13):2547-2556.
Disagreement and the division of epistemic labor.Bjørn G. Hallsson & Klemens Kappel - 2020 - Synthese 197 (7):2823-2847.
‘Peer Disagreement’ and Evidence of Evidence.John Biro & Fabio Lampert - 2018 - Logos and Episteme 9 (4):379-402.
Inclusiveness in the face of anticipated disagreement.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2013 - Synthese 190 (7):1189-1207.
Epistemology of Disagreement, Bias, and Political Deliberation: The Problems for a Conciliatory Democracy.Jay Carlson - 2018 - Topoi 40 (5):1161-1171.
The Problem with Uniform Solutions to Peer Disagreement.Amir Konigsberg - 2013 - Theoria 79 (2):96-126.
Disagreement, peerhood, and three paradoxes of Conciliationism.Thomas Mulligan - 2015 - Synthese 192 (1):67-78.
On What God Would Do.Rob Lovering - 2009 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 66 (2):87-104.
What is Evidence of Evidence Evidence of?Fabio Lampert & John Biro - 2017 - Logos and Episteme 8 (2):195-206.
Explanationism provides the best explanation of the epistemic significance of peer disagreement.Matt Lutz - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (7):1811-1828.
Analytics
Added to PP
2020-02-16
Downloads
45 (#261,698)
6 months
7 (#116,863)
2020-02-16
Downloads
45 (#261,698)
6 months
7 (#116,863)
Historical graph of downloads
Author's Profile
References found in this work
Epistemology of disagreement: The good news.David Christensen - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (2):187-217.
Peer disagreement and higher order evidence.Thomas Kelly - 2010 - In Alvin I. Goldman & Dennis Whitcomb (eds.), Social Epistemology: Essential Readings. Oxford University Press. pp. 183--217.