Carnap, formalism, and informal rigour

Philosophia Mathematica 16 (1):4-24 (2008)

Authors
Gregory Lavers
Concordia University
Abstract
Carnap's position on mathematical truth in The Logical Syntax of Language has been attacked from two sides: Kreisel argues that it is formalistic but should not be, and Friedman argues that it is not formalistic but needs to be. In this paper I argue that the Carnap of Syntax does not eliminate our ordinary notion of mathematical truth in favour of a formal analogue; so Carnap's notion of mathematical truth is not formalistic. I further argue that there is no conflict between Carnap's use of informal notions and his principle of tolerance; so Carnap's definition of mathematical truth need not be formalistic. CiteULike    Connotea    Del.icio.us    What's this?
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DOI 10.1093/philmat/nkl015
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Carnap's Early Semantics.Georg Schiemer - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (3):487-522.
On the Quinean-Analyticity of Mathematical Propositions.Gregory Lavers - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 159 (2):299-319.
Benacerraf’s Dilemma and Informal Mathematics.Gregory Lavers - 2009 - Review of Symbolic Logic 2 (4):769-785.

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