Philosophy Research Archives 11:441-452 (1985)

Abstract
According to the received view, the philosophy of C.I. Lewis is a form of phenomenalism. The first part of this paper is an argument designed to show that Lewis does not support one of the necessary conditions for ontological phenomenalism; namely, the sense-datum theory. The secondpart is an argument designed to show that Lewis’ theory is incompatible with linguistic phenomenalism, a view according to which there is an equivalence of meaning between physical object statements and sense-data statements. The argument is not merely that terminating judgments are not sense-data statements, but that they cannot be equivalent to objective statements
Keywords Contemporary Philosophy  History of Philosophy
Categories (categorize this paper)
ISBN(s) 0164-0771
DOI 10.5840/pra19851125
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 60,750
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

A Study in Phenomenalism.James Giles - 1994 - Aalborg University.
A Defense of Local Miracle Compatibilism.Peter A. Graham - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 140 (1):65 - 82.
An Alternative to the Adverbial Theory: Dis-Phenomenalism.Ran Lahav - 1990 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (3):553-568.
Realism or Phenomenalism?C. I. Lewis - 1955 - Philosophical Review 64 (2):233-247.
C. I. Lewis and the Problem of Phenomenalism.T. Z. Lavine - 1981 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 41 (3):386-395.
Experience, Reality and Conditions for Description.Lars Brink - 1968 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 11 (1-4):85 – 100.
C. I. Lewis and the Pragmatic Rejection of Phenomenalism.Sandra B. Rosenthal - 1980 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 41 (1/2):204-215.
Lewis, Pragmatism, and Phenomenalism: A Revisit.Sandra B. Rosenthal - 1981 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 41 (3):396-400.
C. I. Lewis' Defense of Phenomenalism.James van Cleve - 1981 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 41 (3):325-332.
Functionalism and Phenomenalism: A Critical Note.Colin McGinn - 1980 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 58 (1):35-46.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2011-12-02

Total views
56 ( #185,251 of 2,438,652 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
5 ( #136,199 of 2,438,652 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes