Dissociative Identity: An Objection to Baker’s Constitution Theory

Acta Analytica 26 (4):329-341 (2011)

Authors
Edward Andrew Greetis
University of Colorado, Boulder
Abstract
One of the central problems of personal identity is to determine what we are essentially . In response to this problem, Lynne Rudder Baker espouses a psychological criterion, that is, she claims that persons are essentially psychological. Baker’s theory purports to bypass the problems of other psychological theories such as Dissociative Identity Disorder and the problem of individuating persons synchronically. I argue that the theory’s treatment of Dissociative Identity Disorder leads to untenable results, is invalid, and consequently fails to individuate persons
Keywords Lynne rudder baker  Personal identity  Dissociative identity disorder  Material constitution
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DOI 10.1007/s12136-011-0133-1
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References found in this work BETA

Personal Identity and Dead People.David Mackie - 1999 - Philosophical Studies 95 (3):219-242.
The Ontological Status of Persons.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2):370-388.

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