Epistemic Circularity: Vicious, Virtuous and Benign

International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 1 (2):105-112 (2011)
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Abstract

Sosa's work on epistemic circularity has significance beyond his own brand of virtue epistemology, with its characteristic distinction between animal and reflective knowledge. On the contrary, it demonstrates the necessity of embracing foundationalism and externalism in epistemology, while at the same time answering various charges (some perennial) against epistemology in general. This paper distinguishes six kinds of epistemic circularity that are discussed in Sosa's work: two virtuous, two vicious, and two benign. This framework is used to reconstruct Sosa's responses to various problems involving charges of epistemic circularity. In particular, we look at Sosa's response to e Problem of the Criterion.

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John Greco
Georgetown University

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