From canon to dialectic to antinomy: Giving inclinations their due

Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 48 (3):232 – 248 (2005)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In a recent paper, Eckart Förster challenges interpreters to explain why in the first Critique practical reason has a canon but no dialectic, whereas in the second Critique, there is not only a dialectic, but an antinomy of practical reason. In the Groundwork, Kant claims that there is a natural dialectic with respect to morality (4:405), a different claim from those advanced in the first and second Critiques. Förster's challenge may therefore be reformulated as the problem of explaining why practical reason has a canon in the first Critique, a dialectic in the Groundwork, and an antinomy in the second Critique. In this paper, I answer this challenge. I argue that these differences are due to the different aims and scope of the works, and in particular, the different place of the inclinations in their arguments.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,283

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Emotions and Practical Reason in Kant.Maria Borges - 2007 - The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 10:161-166.
Kant's Dialectic.Jonathan Bennett - 1974 - New York]: Cambridge University Press.
Sartre, Foucault and the Critique of (Dialectical) Reason.Thomas R. Flynn - 2010 - Sartre Studies International 16 (2):17-35.
Kant's account of nature's systematicity and the unity of theoretical and practical reason.Lara Ostaric - 2009 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 52 (2):155 – 178.
Kant on Happiness.Victoria S. Wike - 1987 - Philosophy Research Archives 13:79-90.
Plotinus on dialectic.Annamaria Schiaparelli - 2009 - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 91 (3):253-287.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
58 (#278,230)

6 months
4 (#798,384)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Sean Greenberg
University of California, Irvine

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references