In Scott Hershovitz (ed.), Exploring Law's Empire: The Jurisprudence of Ronald Dworkin. Oxford University Press. pp. 157-198 (2006)
I offer a new argument against the legal positivist view that non-normative social facts can themselves determine the content of the law. I argue that the nature of the determination relation in law is rational determination: the contribution of law-determining practices to the content of the law must be based on reasons. That is why it must be possible in principle to explain what makes the law have the content that it does. It follows, I argue, that non-normative facts about statutes, judicial decisions, and other practices cannot themselves determine the content of the law. A full account must appeal to considerations independent of the practices that determine the relevance of the practices to the content of the law. Normative facts are the best candidates.
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A New Map of Theories of Mental Content: Constitutive Accounts and Normative Theories.Mark Greenberg - 2005 - Philosophical Issues 15 (1):299-320.
An Argument Against the Social Fact Thesis (and Some Additional Preliminary Steps Towards a New Conception of Legal Positivism).Kevin Toh - 2008 - Law and Philosophy 27 (5):445 - 504.
Implications of Indeterminacy: Naturalism in Epistemology and the Philosophy of Law II. [REVIEW]Mark Greenberg - 2011 - Law and Philosophy 30 (4):453-476.
Four Neglected Prescriptions of Hartian Legal Philosophy.Kevin Toh - 2014 - Law and Philosophy 33 (6):689-724.
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