Philosophical Quarterly 52 (209):544-563 (2002)
Moore's 'Proof of an External World' has evoked a variety of responses from philosophers, including bafflement, indignation and sympathetic reconstruction. I argue that Moore should be understood as following Thomas Reid on a variety of points, both epistemological and methodological. Moreover, Moore and Reid are exactly right on all of these points. Hence what I present is a defence of Moore's 'Proof', as well as an interpretation. Finally, I argue that the Reid-Moore position is useful for resolving an issue that has recently received attention in epistemology, namely, how is it that one knows that one is not a brain in a vat?
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References found in this work BETA
Skepticism, Relevant Alternatives, and Deductive Closure.G. C. Stine - 1976 - Philosophical Studies 29 (4):249--261.
Does Practical Rationality Constrain Epistemic Rationality? [REVIEW]Stewart Cohen - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):447-455.
Proof of an External World.George Edward Moore - 1939 - Proceedings of the British Academy 25 (5):273--300.
Citations of this work BETA
On G.E. Moore’s ‘Proof of an External World’.James Owen Weatherall - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (1).
Was Moore a Moorean? On Moore and Scepticism.Peter Baumann - 2009 - European Journal of Philosophy 17 (2):181-200.
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