Illocutionary force and semantic content

Linguistics and Philosophy 23 (5):435-473 (2000)
Authors
Mitchell Green
University of Connecticut
Abstract
Illocutionary force and semantic content are widely held to occupy utterly different categories in at least two ways: Any expression serving as an indicator of illocutionary force must be without semantic content, and no such expression can embed. A refined account of the force/content distinction is offered here that does the explanatory work that the standard distinction does, while, in accounting for the behavior of a range of parenthetical expressions, shows neither nor to be compulsory. The refined account also motivates a development of the "scorekeeping model" of conversation, helps to isolate a distinction between illocutionary force and illocutionary commitment, and reveals one precise respect in which meaning is only explicable in terms of use
Keywords Linguistics   Philosophy of Language   Artificial Intelligence   Computational Linguistics   Semantics   Syntax
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Reprint years 2004
DOI 10.1023/A:1005642421177
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Contextualism, Metaphor, and What is Said.Elisabeth Camp - 2006 - Mind and Language 21 (3):280–309.

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