Abstract

This dissertation explores the phenomenon of inner speech. It takes the form of an introduction, which introduces the phenomenon; three long, largely independent chapters; a conclusion; and an appendix. The first chapter deliberates between two possible theories as to the nature of inner speech. One of these theories is that inner speech is a kind of actual speech, just as much as external speech is a kind of actual speech. When we engage in inner speech, we are actually speaking, but we are doing so silently. The other theory holds that inner speech is a kind of imagined speech. When we produce inner speech, we are imagining performing the action of speaking. The chapter argues for the theory that inner speech is a kind of actual speech. The second chapter argues against a theory which holds that inner speech is dialogic. On this theory, a subject represents different perspectives in inner speech and a dialogue can take place in the same sense in which a dialogue can take place between different individuals in external speech. The chapter borrows some important material from the philosophy of language to show that this position, though it might have some intuitive appeal, is ultimately implausible. The third chapter is concerned with the question whether inner speech can be a source of knowledge of our own beliefs. It shows that the view that inner speech can be such a source is subject to an adapted version of a problem from the epistemology of testimony: roughly, what justification do we have for believing that we believe what we say in inner speech? It makes use of some material from the recent debate about cognitive phenomenology to develop a version of the view which is not subject to this problem. It then provides some initial discussion of the merits of this view. The appendix takes up a more practical issue regarding inner speech. There is a theory that auditory verbal hallucinations – i.e. experiences of voice-hearing – take place when someone produces an utterance in inner speech but loses track of the fact that they have produced the utterance. Accordingly, they have an experience as of something being said and, not realising that they are the source of the experience, postulate some external cause, i.e. someone else speaking. The appendix develops an alternative account which has been suggested in the literature, at times drawing upon earlier work in the dissertation.