Pennsylvania State University Press (2001)

Abstract
The prevailing interpretation of Kant’s _First Critique _in Anglo-American philosophy views his theory of a priori knowledge as basically a theory about the possibility of empirical knowledge, or the a priori conditions for that possibility. Instead, Robert Greenberg argues that Kant is more fundamentally concerned with the possibility of a priori knowledge—the very possibility of the possibility of empirical knowledge in the first place. Greenberg advances four central theses: the _Critique_ is primarily concerned about the possibility, or relation to objects, of a priori_,_ not empirical knowledge, and Kant’s theory of that possibility is defensible; Kant’s transcendental ontology must be distinct from the conditions of the possibility of a priori knowledge; the functions of judgment, in Kant’s discussion of the Table of Judgments, should be seen according to his transcendental logic as having content, not as being just logical forms of judgment making; Kant’s distinction between and connection of ordering relations and reference relations have to be kept in mind to avoid misunderstanding the _Critique_. At every step of the way Greenberg contrasts his view with the major interpretations of Kant by commentators like Henry Allison, Jonathan Bennett, Paul Guyer, and Peter Strawson. Not only does this new approach to Kant present a strong challenge to these dominant interpretations, but by being more true to Kant’s own intent it holds promise for making better sense out of what have been seen as the _First Critique_’s discordant themes
Keywords A priori History
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Reprint years 2008
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Call number B2779.G74 2001
ISBN(s) 9780271028170   0271020830   0271028173   9780271020839
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Kant’s Deduction and Apperception: Explaining the Categories.Dennis Schulting - 2012 - London and Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave-Macmillan.
Kant on the Content of Cognition.Clinton Tolley - 2012 - European Journal of Philosophy 20 (4):200-228.
The Second Step of the B‐Deduction.Frederick Rauscher - 2014 - European Journal of Philosophy 22 (3):396-419.
Contemporary Epistemology: Kant, Hegel, McDowell.Kenneth R. Westphal - 2006 - European Journal of Philosophy 14 (2):274–301.

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