Mitchell Green
University of Connecticut
In recent years the view that understanding a language requires knowing what its words and expressions mean has come under attack. One line of attack attempts to show that while knowledge can be undermined by Gettier-style counterexamples, language understanding cannot be. I consider this line of attack, particularly in the work of Pettit and Longworth, and show it to be unpersuasive. I stress, however, that maintaining a link between language understanding and knowledge does not itself vindicate a cognitivist view of the former.
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DOI 10.4148/biyclc.v5i0.281
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References found in this work BETA

Meaning, Knowledge, and Reality.John Henry McDowell - 1998 - Harvard University Press.
Knowledge of Meaning.Richard Larson & Gabriel Segal - 2000 - Mind 109 (436):960-964.
The Sense of Communication.Richard Heck - 1995 - Mind 104 (413):79 - 106.

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Citations of this work BETA

II—Mitchell Green: Perceiving Emotions.Mitchell Green - 2010 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 84 (1):45-61.
Understanding as Knowledge of Meaning.Alex Barber - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (10):964-977.
Replies to Eriksson, Martin and Moore.Mitchell S. Green - 2010 - Acta Analytica 25 (1):105-117.

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