Metacognition as an Epistemic Virtue

Southwest Philosophy Review 35 (1):117-129 (2019)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This article has no associated abstract. (fix it)

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Moral Motivation and Epistemic Virtue.Chelsea Bowden - 2018 - Southwest Philosophy Review 34 (2):27-31.
With Virtue for All.Eugene Schlossberger - 1989 - Southwest Philosophy Review 5 (1):71-76.
The Autonomous Virtue of Mercy.Carla A. H. Johnson - 2017 - Southwest Philosophy Review 33 (2):179-196.
Rationality and Epistemic Indolence.Roberta Cutler Klein - 1984 - Southwest Philosophy Review 1:161-171.
Social Meliorism, Virtue, and Vice.Susan M. Purviance - 1996 - Southwest Philosophy Review 12 (2):63-83.
Collective Epistemic Agency.Deborah Tollefsen - 2004 - Southwest Philosophy Review 20 (1):55-66.
A Rejection of the Epistemic Closure Principle.Richard Greene - 2001 - Southwest Philosophy Review 17 (2):59-73.
Epistemic Ignorance and Moral Responsibility.Deborah K. Heikes - 2020 - Southwest Philosophy Review 36 (1):93-100.

Analytics

Added to PP
2019-05-05

Downloads
528 (#51,057)

6 months
123 (#40,606)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Jerry Green
University of Central Oklahoma

References found in this work

Two Levels of Metacognition.Santiago Arango-Muñoz - 2011 - Philosophia 39 (1):71-82.
How many dual process theories do we need: one, two or many?Jonathan St B. T. Evans - 2009 - In Jonathan St B. T. Evans & Keith Frankish (eds.), In Two Minds: Dual Processes and Beyond. Oxford University Press.

Add more references