Morality is not good
Emergent Australasian Philosophers 4 (1) (2011)
AbstractMoral nihilism (the denial of the existence of objective moral values) has been argued for for thousands of years. Despite such arguments this view is by no means the majority view. One of the most influential moral nihilists of the 20th Century was John Leslie Mackie, who gave arguments for this position. These arguments, despite many objections, have not been convincingly or decisively overcome. If the arguments are still good, why is moral nihilism such an uncommon view? One possible reason that this view is not more popular among moral philosophers is because it seems to lead to unacceptable consequences: moral fictionalism or abolitionism. I will argue that such philosophers are correct in rejecting moral fictionalism as unacceptable; but that abolitionism is actually a rational, reasonable position that should not cast doubt upon our morally nihilistic beliefs.
Similar books and articles
Moral fictionalism versus the rest.Daniel Nolan, Greg Restall & Caroline West - 2005 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (3):307 – 330.
Error Theory and Fictionalism.Nadeem Hussain - 2010 - In John Skorupski (ed.), The Routledge Companion to Ethics. Routledge.
The Return of Moral Fictionalism.Nadeem J. Z. Hussain - 2004 - Philosophical Perspectives 18 (1):149–188.
Mark Eli Kalderon, Moral Fictionalism:Moral Fictionalism.Zed Adams - 2006 - Ethics 117 (1):131-135.
Question authority: in defense of moral naturalism without clout.Jon Tresan - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 150 (2):221 - 238.
Added to PP
Historical graph of downloads
Citations of this work
Animal Abolitionism Meets Moral Abolitionism: Cutting the Gordian Knot of Applied Ethics.Joel Marks - 2013 - Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 10 (4):1-11.
References found in this work
No references found.