Moore’s Paradox: New Essays on Belief, Rationality, and the First Person

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Oxford, England: Oxford University Press (2007)
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Abstract

G. E. Moore observed that to assert, 'I went to the pictures last Tuesday but I don't believe that I did' would be 'absurd'. Over half a century later, such sayings continue to perplex philosophers. In the definitive treatment of the famous paradox, Green and Williams explain its history and relevance and present new essays by leading thinkers in the area

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B1647.M74.M66 2007

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9780199282791   019928279X
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Chapters

Moore's paradox and the transparency of belief.Jonathan E. Adler & Bradley Armour-Garb
What reflexive pronouns tell us about belief : a new Moore's paradox de se, rationality, and privileged access.Jay David Atlas
The normative character of belief.Thomas Baldwin
Moorean absurdity : an epistemological analysis.Claudio de Almeida
Consciousness, reasons, and Moore's paradox.André Gallois
Moorean pretense.Robert M. Gordon
Introduction.Mitchell Green & John N. Williams
Moorean absurdity and showing what's within.Mitchell Green
My philosophical position says p and I don't believe p.Alan Hájek
The All-seeing Eye :A Blind Spot in the History of Ideas.Roy Sorensen
Moore's paradox, Evans's principle, and iterated beliefs.John N. Williams

Similar books and articles

Moorean pretense.Robert M. Gordon - 2007 - In Mitchell S. Green & John N. Williams (eds.), Moore's Paradox: New Essays on Belief, Rationality, and the First Person. Oxford University Press.
What reflexive pronouns tell us about belief : a new Moore's paradox de se, rationality, and privileged access.Jay David Atlas - 2007 - In Mitchell S. Green & John N. Williams (eds.), Moore's Paradox: New Essays on Belief, Rationality, and the First Person. Oxford University Press.
Moore's paradox and the transparency of belief.Jonathan E. Adler & Bradley Armour-Garb - 2007 - In Mitchell S. Green & John N. Williams (eds.), Moore's Paradox: New Essays on Belief, Rationality, and the First Person. Oxford University Press.
Consciousness, reasons, and Moore's paradox.André Gallois - 2007 - In Mitchell S. Green & John N. Williams (eds.), Moore's Paradox: New Essays on Belief, Rationality, and the First Person. Oxford University Press.
Introduction.Mitchell Green & John N. Williams - 2007 - In Mitchell S. Green & John N. Williams (eds.), Moore's Paradox: New Essays on Belief, Rationality, and the First Person. Oxford University Press.
Moore’s Paradoxes and Conscious Belief.John Nicholas Williams - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 127 (3):383-414.
My philosophical position says p and I don't believe p.Alan Hájek - 2007 - In Mitchell S. Green & John N. Williams (eds.), Moore's Paradox: New Essays on Belief, Rationality, and the First Person. Oxford University Press.
The normative character of belief.Thomas Baldwin - 2007 - In Mitchell S. Green & John N. Williams (eds.), Moore's Paradox: New Essays on Belief, Rationality, and the First Person. Oxford University Press.
Moore's paradox, Evans's principle, and iterated beliefs.John N. Williams - 2007 - In Mitchell S. Green & John N. Williams (eds.), Moore's Paradox: New Essays on Belief, Rationality, and the First Person. Oxford University Press.

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Author Profiles

Mitchell Green
University of Connecticut
John N. Williams
Singapore Management University

Citations of this work

Believing Things Unknown.Aidan McGlynn - 2011 - Noûs 47 (2):385-407.
Judgment as a Guide to Belief.Nicholas Silins - 2012 - In Declan Smithies & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Introspection and Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
Explaining enkratic asymmetries: knowledge-first style.Paul Silva - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (11):2907-2930.
Protest and Speech Act Theory.Matthew Chrisman & Graham Hubbs - 2021 - In Rachel Katharine Sterken & Justin Khoo (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Social and Political Philosophy of Language. New York: Routledge. pp. 179-192.

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