Moore’s Paradox: New Essays on Belief, Rationality, and the First Person

Oxford, England: Oxford University Press (2007)
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Abstract

G. E. Moore observed that to assert, 'I went to the pictures last Tuesday but I don't believe that I did' would be 'absurd'. Over half a century later, such sayings continue to perplex philosophers. In the definitive treatment of the famous paradox, Green and Williams explain its history and relevance and present new essays by leading thinkers in the area

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My philosophical position says p and I don't believe p.Alan Hájek - 2007 - In Mitchell S. Green & John N. Williams (eds.), Moore’s Paradox: New Essays on Belief, Rationality, and the First Person. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
My philosophical position says

and I don't believe

.Alan Hájek - 2007 - In Mitchell S. Green & John N. Williams (eds.), Moore’s Paradox: New Essays on Belief, Rationality, and the First Person. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

Consciousness, reasons, and Moore's paradox.André Gallois - 2007 - In Mitchell S. Green & John N. Williams (eds.), Moore’s Paradox: New Essays on Belief, Rationality, and the First Person. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
Introduction.Mitchell Green & John N. Williams - 2007 - In Mitchell S. Green & John N. Williams (eds.), Moore’s Paradox: New Essays on Belief, Rationality, and the First Person. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
Moore's paradox, Evans's principle, and iterated beliefs.John N. Williams - 2007 - In Mitchell S. Green & John N. Williams (eds.), Moore’s Paradox: New Essays on Belief, Rationality, and the First Person. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
The normative character of belief.Thomas Baldwin - 2007 - In Mitchell S. Green & John N. Williams (eds.), Moore’s Paradox: New Essays on Belief, Rationality, and the First Person. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
Moorean pretense.Robert M. Gordon - 2007 - In Mitchell S. Green & John N. Williams (eds.), Moore’s Paradox: New Essays on Belief, Rationality, and the First Person. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

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Author Profiles

Mitchell Green
University of Connecticut
John N. Williams
Singapore Management University

Citations of this work

Moore's Paradox and the Accessibility of Justification.Declan Smithies - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):273-300.
Believing Things Unknown.Aidan McGlynn - 2011 - Noûs 47 (2):385-407.
Judgment as a Guide to Belief.Nicholas Silins - 2012 - In Declan Smithies & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Introspection and Consciousness. , US: Oxford University Press.
Explaining enkratic asymmetries: knowledge-first style.Paul Silva - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (11):2907-2930.

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