Synthese 171 (3):399 - 408 (2009)
A number of serious problems are raised against Crispin Wright’s quandary conception of vagueness. Two alternative conceptions of the quandary view are proposed instead. The first conception retains Wright’s thesis that, for all one knows, a verdict concerning a borderline case constitutes knowledge. However a further problem is seen to beset this conception. The second conception, in response to this further problem, does not enjoin the thesis that, for all one knows, a verdict concerning a borderline case constitutes knowledge. The result is a much simpler and more plausible version of the quandary view.
|Keywords||Vagueness Borderline cases Ignorance Knowability Quandary Assertion Intuitionistic logic|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
Further Reflections on the Sorites Paradox.Crispin Wright - 1987 - Philosophical Topics 15 (1):227-290.
Citations of this work BETA
Being in a Position to Know and Closure.Jan Heylen - 2016 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 5 (1):63-67.
Similar books and articles
Sarbanes-Oxley and the Compliance Ethics Quandary: A Practitioner's View.Robert M. Krug - 2004 - Business and Professional Ethics Journal 23 (1/2):189-199.
Lifesizing in an Era of Downsizing: An Ethical Quandary. [REVIEW]Robert A. Miller - 1998 - Journal of Business Ethics 17 (15):1693-1700.
Rosenkranz on Quandary, Vagueness and Intuitionism.Crispin Wright - 2003 - Mind 112 (447):465-474.
On Being in a Quandary. Relativism Vagueness Logical Revisionism.C. J. G. Wright - 2001 - Mind 110 (437):45--97.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads75 ( #70,237 of 2,171,798 )
Recent downloads (6 months)4 ( #76,305 of 2,171,798 )
How can I increase my downloads?