In Russell Schafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, vol. II. Clarendon Press. pp. 172-194 (2007)

Authors
Patricia S. Greenspan
University of Maryland, College Park
Abstract
Morality is a source of reasons for action, what philosophers call practical reasons. Kantians say that it ‘gives’ reasons to everyone. We can even think of moral requirements as amounting to particularly strong or stringent reasons, in an effort to demystify deontological views like Kant’s, with its insistence on inescapable or ‘binding’ moral requirements or ‘oughts.’¹ When we say that someone morally ought not to harm others, perhaps all we are saying is that he has a certain kind of reason not to, one that wins out against any opposing reasons such as those touting benefits to him of ignoring others’ concerns
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References found in this work BETA

What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
The Possibility of Altruism.Thomas Nagel - 1970 - Oxford Clarendon Press.
Freedom and Reason.R. M. Hare - 1963 - Oxford, Clarendon Press.
Internal and External Reasons.Bernard Williams - 1979 - In Ross Harrison (ed.), Rational Action. Cambridge University Press. pp. 101-113.

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Citations of this work BETA

Understanding Standing: Permission to Deflect Reasons.Ori Herstein - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (12):3109-3132.
Conflicting Reasons, Unconflicting ‘Ought's.Shyam Nair - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (3):629-663.
Deontic Reasons and Distant Need.Sarah Clark Miller - 2008 - Southwest Philosophy Review 24 (1):61-70.

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