Acta Analytica:1-11 (forthcoming)

Authors
Derek Green
University of Central Florida
Abstract
Mental content normativists hold that the mind’s conceptual contents are essentially normative. Many hold the view because they think that facts of the form “subject S possesses concept c” imply that S is enjoined by rules concerning the application of c in theoretical judgments. Some opponents independently raise an intuitive objection: even if there are such rules, S’s possession of the concept is not the source of the enjoinment. Hence, these rules do not support mental content normativism. Call this the “Source Objection.” This paper refutes the Source Objection, outlining a key strand of the relationship between judgments and their contents in the process. Theoretical judgment and mental conceptual content are equally the source of enjoinment; norms for judging with contents do not derive from one at the expense of the other.
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DOI 10.1007/s12136-020-00436-y
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References found in this work BETA

Doxastic Deliberation.Nishi Shah & J. David Velleman - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (4):497-534.
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.
How Truth Governs Belief.Nishi Shah - 2003 - Philosophical Review 112 (4):447-482.
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