Speech acts

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2010)

Authors
Mitchell Green
University of Connecticut
Abstract
Speech acts are a staple of everyday communicative life, but only became a topic of sustained investigation, at least in the English-speaking world, in the middle of the Twentieth Century.[1] Since that time “speech act theory” has been influential not only within philosophy, but also in linguistics, psychology, legal theory, artificial intelligence, literary theory and many other scholarly disciplines.[2] Recognition of the importance of speech acts has illuminated the ability of language to do other things than describe reality. In the process the boundaries among the philosophy of language, the philosophy of action, the philosophy of mind and even ethics have become less sharp. In addition, an appreciation of speech acts has helped lay bare an implicit normative structure within linguistic practice, including even that part of this practice concerned with describing reality. Much recent research aims at an accurate characterization of this normative structure underlying linguistic practice
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Levels of Linguistic Acts and the Semantics of Saying and Quoting.Friederike Moltmann - 2017 - In Savas L. Tsohatzidis (ed.), Interpreting Austin: Critical Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 34-59.
Imagery, Expression, and Metaphor.Mitchell Green - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (1):33--46.
Assertion: Just One Way to Take It Back.Mona Simion - 2016 - Logos and Episteme 7 (3):385-391.

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