Vivarium 45 (s 2-3):328-342 (2007)

Abstract
The aim of this paper is to examine the medieval posterity of the Aristotelian and Pyrrhonian treatments of the infinite regress argument. We show that there are some possible Pyrrhonian elements in Autrecourt's epistemology when he argues that the truth of our principles is merely hypothetical. By contrast, Buridan's criticisms of Autrecourt rely heavily on Aristotelian material. Both exemplify a use of scepticism.
Keywords PRINCIPLES   TRUTH   INFINITE REGRESS   EVIDENTNESS   SCEPTICISM
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DOI 10.1163/156853407x217803
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Induction and Natural Necessity in the Middle Ages.Stathis Psillos - 2015 - Philosophical Inquiry 39 (1):92-134.
Medieval Skepticism.Charles Bolyard - 2009 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Nicholas of Autrecourt.Hans Thijssen - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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