Authors
Derek Green
University of Central Florida
Abstract
Saul Kripke's influential ‘sceptical paradox’ of semantic rule-following alleges that speakers cannot have any justification for using a word one way rather than another. If it is correct, there can be no such thing as meaning anything by a word. I argue that the paradox fails to undermine meaning. Kripke never adequately motivates its excessively strict standard for the justified use of words. The paradox lacks the resources to show that its standard is truly mandatory or that speakers do not frequently satisfy the well-motivated competitor I offer. So the paradox fails
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Reprint years 2017
DOI 10.1111/papq.12146
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References found in this work BETA

The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford University Press.
Self-Knowledge.Brie Gertler - 2015 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Philosophical investigations.Ludwig Wittgenstein & G. E. M. Anscombe - 1953 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 161:124-124.

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