The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 5:139-147 (2000)
I review a familiar skeptical argument from Hume, and conclude that it requires us to accept that there is no necessary relation between beliefs about the world and their evidential grounds; that is, there is no logical or quasi-logical relation between empirical beliefs and their grounds, such that their grounds entail them, or even make them probable. I then argue that generic reliabilism can accommodate this fact about evidential grounds in a non-skeptical way. According to reliabilism, the grounds for our beliefs constitute good evidence so long as they are contingently reliable. Next I argue that agent reliabilism successfully addresses two related problems for other versions of reliabilism: the fact that beliefs can be reliably formed by accident, and the need for subjective justification. Finally, I explain why agent reliabilism is properly conceived as a version of virtue epistemology
|Keywords||Conference Proceedings Contemporary Philosophy General Interest|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
From Reliabilism to Virtue Epistemology.Linda Zagzebski - 2000 - The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 5:173-179.
Can Virtue Reliabilism Explain the Value of Knowledge?Berit Brogaard - 2006 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (3):335-354.
Reliabilism—Modal, Probabilistic or Contextualist.Peter Baumann - 2009 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 79 (1):77-89.
Recent Work on Virtue Epistemology.Guy Axtell - 1997 - American Philosophical Quarterly 34 (1):1 - 26.
Goldman on Evidence and Reliability.Jack C. Lyons - 2016 - In H. Kornblith & B. McLaughlin (eds.), Goldman and His Critics. Blackwell.
Reliabilism 'Naturalized'.Steven Miller & Marcel Fredericks - 2002 - Social Epistemology 16 (4):367 – 376.
Evidential Support, Reliability, and Hume's Problem of Induction.Chris Tucker - 2009 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (4):503-519.
Agent Reliabilism, Subjective Justification, and Epistemic Credit.Christine McKinnon - 2006 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 44 (3):489-508.
Added to index2012-03-18
Total downloads36 ( #139,169 of 2,152,002 )
Recent downloads (6 months)8 ( #89,484 of 2,152,002 )
How can I increase my downloads?
There are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.