American Philosophical Quarterly 50 (1):63-72 (2013)

Authors
Alex Gregory
University of Southampton
Abstract
In this paper it is argued that we should amend the traditional understanding of the view known as the guise of the good. The guise of the good is traditionally understood as the view that we only want to act in ways that we believe to be good in some way. But it is argued that a more plausible view is that we only want to act in ways that we believe we have normative reason to act in. This change – from formulating the view in terms of goodness to formulating it in terms of reasons – is significant because the revised view avoids various old and new counterexamples to the traditional view, because the revised view is better motivated than the traditional view, and because the revised view is better placed to explain certain features of desire than the traditional view. The paper finishes by showing that the conclusions reached are compatible with theories such as the buck passing account of value.
Keywords guise of the good  reasons  good  desire  Satan
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References found in this work BETA

What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Internal and External Reasons.Bernard Williams - 1979 - In Ross Harrison (ed.), Rational Action. Cambridge University Press. pp. 101-113.
Free Agency.Gary Watson - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (April):205-20.
Slaves of the Passions.Mark Schroeder - 2009 - Analysis 69 (3):574-576.

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Citations of this work BETA

Desire and What It’s Rational to Do.Ashley Shaw - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-15.
A Perceptual Theory of Hope.Michael Milona & Katie Stockdale - 2018 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 5.
Normative Reasons as Good Bases.Alex Gregory - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (9):2291-2310.
Might Desires Be Beliefs About Normative Reasons?Alex Gregory - 2017 - In Julien Deonna & Federico Lauria (eds.), The Nature of Desire. Oxford University Press. pp. 201-217.
The Guise of the Good.Francesco Orsi - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (10):714-724.

View all 25 citations / Add more citations

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