The Leap of Faith

Philosophy and Theology 3 (4):385-411 (1989)

Following an introductory examination of possible reasons why past researchers have overlooked Kierkegaard’s debt to Kant, two specific areas of influence are documented and analyzed: the ideality of ethics, and the notion of faith as a leap. Closing remarks suggest that there are other areas as yet undocumented
Keywords Catholic Tradition  Philosophy and Religion
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ISBN(s) 0890-2461
DOI 10.5840/philtheol19893412
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The Concept of the Highest Good in Kierkegaard and Kant.Roe Fremstedal - 2011 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 69 (3):155-171.
Kierkegaard on the Metaphysics of Hope.Roe Fremstedal - 2012 - Heythrop Journal 53 (1):51-60.

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