Truth-Relativism, Norm-Relativism, and Assertion

In Jessica Brown & Herman Cappelen (eds.), Assertion: New Philosophical Essays. Oxford University Press (2011)

Abstract

The main goal in this paper is to outline and defend a form of Relativism, under which truth is absolute but assertibility is not. I dub such a view Norm-Relativism in contrast to the more familiar forms of Truth-Relativism. The key feature of this view is that just what norm of assertion, belief, and action is in play in some context is itself relative to a perspective. In slogan form: there is no fixed, single norm for assertion, belief, and action. Upshot: 'knows' is neither context-sensitive nor perspectival.

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Citations of this work

Truth and Assertion: Rules Vs Aims.Neri Marsili - 2018 - Analysis 78 (4):638–648.
Problems with Norms of Assertion.Peter Pagin - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (1):178-207.
Assertion.Peter Pagin & Neri Marsili - 2021 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
The Explanation Proffering Norm of Moral Assertion.Mona Simion - 2018 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21 (3):477-488.

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