In Jessica Brown & Herman Cappelen (eds.), Assertion: New Philosophical Essays. Oxford University Press (2011)

Authors
Patrick Greenough
University of St. Andrews
Abstract
The main goal in this paper is to outline and defend a form of Relativism, under which truth is absolute but assertibility is not. I dub such a view Norm-Relativism in contrast to the more familiar forms of Truth-Relativism. The key feature of this view is that just what norm of assertion, belief, and action is in play in some context is itself relative to a perspective. In slogan form: there is no fixed, single norm for assertion, belief, and action. Upshot: 'knows' is neither context-sensitive nor perspectival.
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Assertion.Peter Pagin - 2015 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Problems with Norms of Assertion.Peter Pagin - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (1):178-207.
Truth and Assertion: Rules Vs Aims.Neri Marsili - 2018 - Analysis 78 (4):638–648.
Assessment Sensitivity.Filippo Ferrari - 2016 - Analysis 76 (4):516-527.
Assertion: The Context Shiftiness Dilemma.Mona Simion - 2019 - Mind and Language 34 (4):503-517.

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