Truth-Relativism, Norm-Relativism, and Assertion

In Brown J. & Cappelen H. (eds.), Assertion: New Philosophical Essays. Oxford University Press (2011)
Abstract
The main goal in this paper is to outline and defend a form of Relativism, under which truth is absolute but assertibility is not. I dub such a view Norm-Relativism in contrast to the more familiar forms of Truth-Relativism. The key feature of this view is that just what norm of assertion, belief, and action is in play in some context is itself relative to a perspective. In slogan form: there is no fixed, single norm for assertion, belief, and action. Upshot: 'knows' is neither context-sensitive nor perspectival.
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Assertion and Relative Truth.Ramiro Caso - 2014 - Synthese 191 (6):1309-1325.

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