Neutralism and the Observational Sorites Paradox

In Ali Abasnezhad & Otavio Bueno (eds.), Synthese Special Edition. Springer (forthcoming)
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Abstract

Neutralism is the broad view that philosophical progress can take place when (and sometimes only when) a thoroughly neutral, non-specific theory, treatment, or methodology is adopted. The broad goal here is to articulate a distinct, specific kind of sorites paradox (The Observational Sorites Paradox) and show that it can be effectively treated via Neutralism.

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Patrick Greenough
University of St. Andrews

Citations of this work

Neutralism and Conceptual Engineering.Patrick Greenough - 2019 - In Alexis Burgess, Herman Cappelen & David Plunkett (eds.), Conceptual Engineering and Conceptual Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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References found in this work

Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.
Truth.Paul Horwich - 1990 - Clarendon Press.
Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):200-201.
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (210):105-116.
Vagueness, truth and logic.Kit Fine - 1975 - Synthese 30 (3-4):265-300.

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