Journal of Philosophy 113 (8):365-395 (2016)

Authors
Daniel Greco
Yale University
Abstract
We defend Uniqueness, the claim that given a body of total evidence, there is a uniquely rational doxastic state that it is rational for one to be in. Epistemic rationality doesn't give you any leeway in forming your beliefs. To this end, we bring in two metaepistemological pictures about the roles played by rational evaluations. Rational evaluative terms serve to guide our practices of deference to the opinions of others, and also to help us formulate contingency plans about what to believe in various situations. We argue that Uniqueness vindicates these two roles for rational evaluations, while Permissivism clashes with them.
Keywords Analytic Philosophy  Contemporary Philosophy
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ISBN(s) 0022-362X
DOI 10.5840/jphil2016113825
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References found in this work BETA

Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News.David Christensen - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (2):187-217.
Why Be Rational.Niko Kolodny - 2005 - Mind 114 (455):509-563.
Reflection and Disagreement.Adam Elga - 2007 - Noûs 41 (3):478–502.
Impermissive Bayesianism.Christopher Meacham - 2013 - Erkenntnis 79 (Suppl 6):1185-1217.

View all 43 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Belief and Credence: Why the Attitude-Type Matters.Elizabeth Jackson - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (9):2477-2496.
The Uniqueness Thesis.Matthew Kopec & Michael G. Titelbaum - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (4):189-200.
How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Probability 1.Daniel Greco - 2015 - Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):179-201.

View all 33 citations / Add more citations

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