Desire as Belief: A Study of Desire, Motivation, and Rationality

Oxford University Press (forthcoming)

Authors
Alex Gregory
University of Southampton
Abstract
What is it to want something? Or, as philosophers might ask, what is a desire? This book defends “desire-as-belief”, the view that desires are just a special subset of our beliefs: normative beliefs. This view entitles us to accept orthodox models of human motivation and rationality that explain those things with reference to desire, but nonetheless to also make room for our normative beliefs to play a role in those domains. And this view tells us to diverge from the orthodox view on which desires themselves can never be right or wrong. Rather, according to desire-as-belief, our desires can themselves be assessed for their accuracy, and they are wrong when they misrepresent normative features of the world. Hume says that it is not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of your finger, but he is wrong: it is foolish to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of your finger, and this is foolish because this preference misrepresents the relative worth of these things.
Keywords desire  desire-as-belief  reasons  motivation  rationality  preference  want
Categories (categorize this paper)
Buy this book $70.00 new   Amazon page
ISBN(s)   019884817X
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 60,021
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Reasons to Desire and Desiring at Will.Victor M. Verdejo - 2017 - Metaphilosophy 48 (3):355-369.
Wants and Desires: A Critique of Conativist Theory of Motivation.Chris Meyers - 2005 - Journal of Philosophical Research:357-370.
Practical Reasons and Internalism.Hans Vilhelm Hansen - 1990 - Dissertation, Wayne State University
Belief and Motivation.Daniel Friedrich - 2014 - Theoria 80 (3):255-268.
Parfit’s Challenges.Marko Jurjako - 2011 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 11 (2):237-248.
Nonbelief and the Desire-as-Belief Thesis.Charles B. Cross - 2008 - Acta Analytica 23 (2):115-124.
Belief, Desire and Motivation: An Essay in Quasi-Hydraulics.James Lenman - 1996 - American Philosophical Quarterly 33 (3):291-301.
Might Desires Be Beliefs About Normative Reasons?Alex Gregory - 2017 - In Julien Deonna & Federico Lauria (eds.), The Nature of Desire. Oxford University Press. pp. 201-217.
Ends, Desires, and Rationality.Oliver Black - 1994 - International Philosophical Quarterly 34 (1):75-88.
Psychology for Cooperators.Adam Morton - 2001 - In Christopher W. Morris & Arthur Ripstein (eds.), Practical Rationality and Preference: Essays for David Gauthier. Cambridge University Press. pp. 153.
The Practical Rationality of Induction.Aristophanes Koutoungos - 2008 - Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 33:27-30.
Additive Theories of Rationality: A Critique.Matthew Boyle - 2016 - European Journal of Philosophy 24 (3):527-555.
Backgrounding Desire.Philip Pettit & Michael Smith - 1990 - Philosophical Review 99 (4):565-592.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2019-03-27

Total views
1 ( #1,477,503 of 2,433,520 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #468,801 of 2,433,520 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.

My notes