Philosophical Quarterly 49 (196):289-308 (1999)

Karen Green
University of Melbourne
This paper argues that Dummett’s interpretation of the relationship between Frege’s anti-psychologism and Wittgenstein’s doctrine that meaning is use results in a misreading of Frege. It points out that anti-mentalism is a form of anti-psychologism, but that mentalism is not the only version of psycholgism. Thus, while Frege and Wittgenstein are united in their opposition to mentalism, they are not equally opposed to psychologism, and from Frege’s point of view, the doctrine that meaning is use could also imply a version of psychologism. It then offers a realist and externalist reading of Frege’s understanding of concepts, which is more in line with what Frege intended by anti-psychologism.
Keywords mentalism  psychologism  concepts  radical conventionalism
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DOI 10.1111/1467-9213.00143
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References found in this work BETA

The Logical Basis of Metaphysics.Michael Dummett - 1991 - Harvard University Press.
Truth and Other Enigmas.Michael Dummett - 1978 - Cambridge, MA, USA: Harvard University Press.
Frege: Philosophy of Mathematics.Michael Dummett - 1991 - Harvard University Press.
Causality and Properties.Sydney Shoemaker - 1980 - In Peter van Inwagen (ed.), Time and Cause. D. Reidel. pp. 109-35.

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Concrete Concepts in Basic Cognition.Rasmus Gahrn-Andersen - 2022 - Philosophia 50 (3):1093-1116.

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