Does free will remain a mystery? A response to Van Inwagen

Philosophical Studies 124 (3):261-269 (2005)
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Abstract

In this paper, I argue against Peter van Inwagen’s claim (in “Free Will Remains a Mystery”), that agent-causal views of free will could do nothing to solve the problem of free will (specifically, the problem of chanciness). After explaining van Inwagen’s argument, I argue that he does not consider all possible manifestations of the agent-causal position. More importantly, I claim that, in any case, van Inwagen appears to have mischaracterized the problem in some crucial ways. Once we are clear on the true nature of the problem of chanciness, agent-causal views do much to eradicate it

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Meghan Griffith
Davidson College

Citations of this work

Rolling back the Rollback Argument.László Bernáth & János Tőzsér - 2020 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 2 (39):43-61.
Counterfactuals of Freedom and the Luck Objection to Libertarianism.Robert J. Hartman - 2017 - Journal of Philosophical Research 42 (1):301-312.

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References found in this work

Persons and Causes: The Metaphysics of Free Will.Timothy O'Connor - 2000 - New York, US: Oxford University Press USA.
Free will remains a mystery.Peter Van Inwagen - 2000 - Philosophical Perspectives 14:1-20.
Two kinds of incompatibilism.Robert Kane - 1989 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (2):219-54.
Two Kinds of Incompatibilism.Robert Kane - 1989 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (2):219-254.

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