Philosophical Studies 124 (3):261-269 (2005)

Abstract
In this paper, I argue against Peter van Inwagen’s claim (in “Free Will Remains a Mystery”), that agent-causal views of free will could do nothing to solve the problem of free will (specifically, the problem of chanciness). After explaining van Inwagen’s argument, I argue that he does not consider all possible manifestations of the agent-causal position. More importantly, I claim that, in any case, van Inwagen appears to have mischaracterized the problem in some crucial ways. Once we are clear on the true nature of the problem of chanciness, agent-causal views do much to eradicate it
Keywords Agent  Causation  Chance  Free Will  Metaphysics  Van Inwagen, Peter
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-005-7778-9
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References found in this work BETA

Free Will Remains a Mystery.Peter Van Inwagen - 2000 - Philosophical Perspectives 14:1-20.
Two Kinds of Incompatibilism.Robert Kane - 1989 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (2):219-54.
Two Kinds of Incompatibilism.Robert Kane - 1989 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (2):219-254.

View all 6 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Rolling Back the Rollback Argument.László Bernáth & János Tőzsér - 2020 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 2 (39):43-61.
Counterfactuals of Freedom and the Luck Objection to Libertarianism.Robert J. Hartman - 2017 - Journal of Philosophical Research 42 (1):301-312.

View all 10 citations / Add more citations

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Free Will Remains a Mystery.Peter Van Inwagen - 2000 - Philosophical Perspectives 14:1-20.
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