Epistemic Normativity

In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic Value. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 243-264 (2009)
Abstract
In this article, from the 2009 Oxford University Press collection Epistemic Value, I criticize existing accounts of epistemic normativity by Alston, Goldman, and Sosa, and then offer a new view.
Keywords Epistemology  Normativity  Value
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Epistemic Goals and Epistemic Values.Stephen R. Grimm - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (3):725-744.
Truth Promoting Non-Evidential Reasons for Belief.Brian Talbot - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 168 (3):599-618.
Why Knowledge Matters.Alan Millar - 2011 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 85 (1):63-81.

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