In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic Value. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 243-264 (2009)

Authors
Stephen Grimm
Fordham University
Abstract
In this article, from the 2009 Oxford University Press collection Epistemic Value, I criticize existing accounts of epistemic normativity by Alston, Goldman, and Sosa, and then offer a new view.
Keywords Epistemology  Normativity  Value
Categories (categorize this paper)
Buy the book Find it on Amazon.com
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Epistemic Teleology and the Separateness of Propositions.Selim Berker - 2013 - Philosophical Review 122 (3):337-393.
The Rejection of Epistemic Consequentialism.Selim Berker - 2013 - Philosophical Issues 23 (1):363-387.
An Epistemic Non-Consequentialism.Kurt L. Sylvan - 2020 - The Philosophical Review 129 (1):1-51.
Junk Beliefs and Interest‐Driven Epistemology.Jane Friedman - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (3):568-583.

View all 40 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-03-19

Total views
954 ( #5,070 of 2,433,173 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
91 ( #7,255 of 2,433,173 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes