Information and meaning: Use-based models in arrays of neural nets [Book Review]

Minds and Machines 14 (1):43-66 (2004)
The goal of philosophy of information is to understand what information is, how it operates, and how to put it to work. But unlike ‘information’ in the technical sense of information theory, what we are interested in is meaningful information. To understand the nature and dynamics of information in this sense we have to understand meaning. What we offer here are simple computational models that show emergence of meaning and information transfer in randomized arrays of neural nets. These we take to be formal instantiations of a tradition of theories of meaning as use. What they offer, we propose, is a glimpse into the origin and dynamics of at least simple forms of meaning and information transfer as properties inherent in behavioral coordination across a community
Keywords Computer Science   Philosophy of Mind   Artificial Intelligence   Systems Theory, Control   Interdisciplinary Studies
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DOI 10.1023/B:MIND.0000005135.23580.9a
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