Filozofski Vestnik 26 (2):53-65 (2005)

Authors
Russell Grigg
Deakin University
Abstract
The fact that statements about "nothing" are, or are always equivalent to, a universal statement raises the question of a non-universalizable, non-completable nothing. Lacan’s pas-tout is an attempt to logically capture this incompleteness that can never be completed. While the pas-tout is relevant to the field of sexuation, its logic can be considered independent of it. This logic is, of course, a "deviant" logic, and for this reason raises questions about how it is to be interpreted. Alain Badiou criticizes Lacan for adopting a pre-Cantorian attitude towards the infinite and for advocating the strictures of intuitionism. I argue that Lacan is not an intuitionist but a constructivist about mathematics. I also consider Jacques-Alain Miller’s suggestion that Lacan’s pastout can be considered a variant of the Aristotelian negative particular statement, "Not all As are B" or "Not every A is B"
Keywords 220314 Philosophy of Mind (excl Cognition)
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The Power of the Hexagon.Jean-Yves Béziau - 2012 - Logica Universalis 6 (1-2):1-43.
A Bibliography of Work on and by Alain Badiou in English.Paul Ashton - 2006 - Cosmos and History : The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy 2 (1-2):313-326.

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