Relative Identity

Clarendon Press (1977)
The author attacks the view that identity, Like largeness, Is a relative relation. The primary advocate of the view that identity is relative is p.T. Geach. It is argued that geach has not shown that the failure of the identity of indiscernibles principle, As a truth of logic, Forces us to stop taking indiscernibility within particular formal theories or languages as a sufficient condition for identity. The author also argues that the whole notion of relative identity, As explicated by geach, Is very probably incoherent.
Keywords Identity (Philosophical concept
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Call number BC199.I4.G74
ISBN(s) 0198244096  
DOI 10.2307/2214425
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