Reinflating Logical Consequence

Journal of Philosophical Logic (1):1-9 (2012)
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Abstract

Shapiro (Philos Q 61:320–342, 2011) argues that, if we are deflationists about truth, we should be deflationists about logical consequence. Like the truth predicate, he claims, the logical consequence predicate is merely a device of generalisation and more substantial characterisation, e.g. proof- or model-theoretic, is mistaken. I reject his analogy between truth and logical consequence and argue that, by appreciating how the logical consequence predicate is used as well as the goals of proof theory and model theory, we can be deflationists about truth but not logical consequence

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Owen Griffiths
London School of Economics

References found in this work

In Contradiction: A Study of the Transconsistent.Graham Priest - 1987 - Dordrecht, Netherland: Oxford University Press.
Saving Truth From Paradox.Hartry Field - 2008 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
Outline of a theory of truth.Saul Kripke - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (19):690-716.
Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics.Alfred Tarski - 1956 - Oxford, Clarendon Press.
Logical Pluralism.Jc Beall & Greg Restall - 2005 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

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