Journal of the American Philosophical Association 8 (1):92-109 (2022)
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Abstract |
This paper defends a new version of truthmaker non-maximalism. The central feature of the view is the notion of a default truth-value. I offer a novel explanation for default truth-values and use it to motivate a general approach to the relation between truth-value and ontology, which I call truth-value-maker theory. According to this view, some propositions are false unless made true, whereas others are true unless made false. A consequence of the theory is that negative existential truths need no truthmakers and that positive existential falsehoods need no falsemakers.
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DOI | 10.1017/apa.2020.42 |
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References found in this work BETA
Being Positive About Negative Facts.Mark Jago & Stephen Barker - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (1):117-138.
The Philosophy of Logical Atomism, Lectures 1-2.Bertrand Russell - 1918 - The Monist 28 (4):495-527.
Grounding Nonexistence.Daniel Muñoz - 2020 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 63 (2):209-229.
Truthmakers for Negative Truths.George Molnar - 2000 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (1):72 – 86.
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