The normative core of paternalism

Res Publica 13 (4):441-458 (2007)

Authors
Kalle Grill
Umeå University
Abstract
The philosophical debate on paternalism is conducted as if the property of being paternalistic should be attributed to actions. Actions are typically deemed to be paternalistic if they amount to some kind of interference with a person and if the rationale for the action is the good of the person interfered with. This focus on actions obscures the normative issues involved. In particular, it makes it hard to provide an analysis of the traditional liberal resistance to paternalism. Given the fact that actions most often have mixed rationales, it is not clear how we should categorize and evaluate interfering actions for which only part of the rationale is the good of the person. The preferable solution is to attribute the property of being paternalistic not to actions, but to compounds of reasons and actions. The framework of action–reasons provides the tools for distinguishing where exactly paternalism lies in the complex web of reasons and actions
Keywords actions  action-reasons  anti-paternalism  harm to others  interference  paternalism  reasons
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s11158-007-9036-9
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

References found in this work BETA

Paternalism.Gerald Dworkin - 1972 - The Monist 56 (1):64-84.
Paternalistic Behavior.Bernard Gert & Charles M. Culver - 1976 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 6 (1):45-57.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Relational Autonomy and the Social Dynamics of Paternalism.John Christman - 2014 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (3):369-382.
Paternalism.Jessica Begon - 2016 - Analysis 76 (3):355-373.
A Normatively Neutral Definition of Paternalism.Emma C. Bullock - 2015 - Philosophical Quarterly 65 (258):1-21.

View all 16 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Self-Knowledge and the First Person.Cynthia Macdonald - 2004 - In M. Sie, Marc Slors & B. Van den Brink (eds.), Reasons of One's Own. Ashgate.
Paternalism.Kalle Grill - 2011 - In Ruth Chadwick (ed.), Encyclopedia of Applied Ethics. Academic Press.
Paternalism in the Neonatal Intensive Care Unit.Carson Strong - 1984 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 5 (1).
A Definition for Paternalism.Paul Turner Hershey - 1985 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 10 (2):171-182.
A Trust-Based Argument Against Paternalism.Simon R. Clarke - 2013 - In Pekka Makela & Cynthia Townley (eds.), Trust: Analytic and Applied Persectives. Amsterdam, Netherlands: Rodopi. pp. 53-75.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
502 ( #10,297 of 2,310,410 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
63 ( #10,496 of 2,310,410 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature