Is there a Gap in Kant’s B Deduction?

Abstract

In "Beyond the Myth of the Myth: A Kantian Theory of Non-Conceptual Content", Robert Hanna argues for a very strong kind of non-conceptualism, and claims that this kind of non-conceptualism originally has been developed by Kant. But according to "Kant's Non-Conceptualism, Rogue Objects and the Gap in the B Deduction", Kant's non-conceptualism poses a serious problem for his argument for the objective validity of the categories, namely the problem that there is a gap in the B Deduction. This gap is that the B Deduction goes through only if conceptualism is true, but Kant is a non-conceptualist. In this paper I argue, contrary to what Hanna claims, that there is not a gap in the B Deduction.

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Author's Profile

Stefanie Grüne
University of Cologne

References found in this work

Mind and World.John McDowell - 1994 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
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Mind and World.John Mcdowell - 1996 - Philosophical Quarterly 46 (182):99-109.
The Bounds of Sense.P. F. Strawson - 1966 - Philosophy 42 (162):379-382.

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