Perception and non-inferential knowledge of action

Philosophical Explorations 14 (2):153 - 167 (2011)
Abstract
I present an account of how agents can know what they are doing when they intentionally execute object-oriented actions. When an agent executes an object-oriented intentional action, she uses perception in such a way that it can fulfil a justificatory role for her knowledge of her own action and it can fulfil this justificatory role without being inferentially linked to the cognitive states that it justifies. I argue for this proposal by meeting two challenges: in an agent's knowledge of her action perception can only play an enabling role (and no justificatory role) for the agent's knowledge and if perception has a justificatory role, then the agent's knowledge must be inferential.
Keywords knowledge of action  perception  practical reasoning  visual attention  non-inferential justification
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DOI 10.1080/13869795.2011.569746
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References found in this work BETA
Action in Perception.Alva Noë - 2005 - MIT Press.
Consciousness in Action.Susan L. Hurley - 1998 - Harvard University Press.
Intention.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1957 - Harvard University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA
Non-Observational Knowledge of Action.John Schwenkler - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (10):731-740.

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