Philosophia 36 (1):67-86 (2008)

Authors
Thor Grünbaum
University of Copenhagen
Abstract
New Volitionalism is a name for certain widespread conception of the nature of intentional action. Some of the standard arguments for New Volitionalism, the so-called arguments from total failure, have even acquired the status of basic assumptions for many other kinds of philosophers. It is therefore of singular interest to investigate some of the most important arguments from total failure. This is what I propose to do in this paper. My aim is not be to demonstrate that these arguments are inconsistent or that total failure and naked tryings are metaphysically impossible. Rather, my aim is be to build a case against the possibility of naked, independently existing tryings, by questioning how well we understand the scenarios invoked in their favour. Thus, rather than attempting to present a definitive metaphysical refutation of New Volitionalism, I attempt to diminish or demolish its underlying motivation.
Keywords Trying  Arguments from total failure  Intentional action  Phenomenology of acting  Perception  Basic action
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DOI 10.1007/s11406-007-9096-2
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References found in this work BETA

The View From Nowhere.Thomas Nagel - 1986 - Oxford University Press.
Consciousness in Action.Susan L. Hurley - 1998 - Harvard University Press.
Intention.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1957 - Harvard University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Towards a Definition of Efforts.Olivier Massin - 2017 - Motivation Science 3 (3):230-259.
Quand Vouloir, c'est Faire [How to Do Things with Wants].Olivier Massin - 2014 - In R. Clot-Goudard (Dir.), L'Explication de L'Action. Analyses Contemporaines, Recherches Sur la Philosophie Et le Langage N°30, Paris, Vrin 30.
Trying in Some Way.David-Hillel Ruben - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (4):719-733.

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