The feeling of agency hypothesis: a critique

Synthese 192 (10):3313-3337 (2015)

Thor Grünbaum
University of Copenhagen
A dominant view in contemporary cognitive neuroscience is that low-level, comparator-based mechanisms of motor control produce a distinctive experience often called the feeling of agency . An opposing view is that comparator-based motor control is largely non-conscious and not associated with any particular type of distinctive phenomenology . In this paper, I critically evaluate the nature of the empirical evidence researchers commonly take to support FoA-hypothesis. The aim of this paper is not only to scrutinize the FoA-hypothesis and data supposed to support it; it is equally to argue that experimentalists supporting the FoA-hypothesis fail to establish that the experimental outcomes are more probable given the FoA-hypothesis than given the simpler hypothesis.
Keywords Feeling of agency  Comparator mechanisms  Motor cognition  Cognitive neuroscience  Philosophy of action  Philosophy of science
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-015-0704-6
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References found in this work BETA

The Illusion of Conscious Will.Daniel Wegner - 2004 - Mind 113 (449):218-221.
Perceptual Consciousness Overflows Cognitive Access.Ned Block - 2011 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 15 (12):567-575.

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Citations of this work BETA

Sense of Agency for Movements.Mark Schram Christensen & Thor Grünbaum - 2018 - Consciousness and Cognition 65:27-47.

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