Context-sensitive truth-theoretic accounts of semantic competence

Mind and Language 20 (1):68–102 (2005)
According to cognitivist truth-theoretic accounts of semantic competence, aspects of our linguistic behavior can be explained by ascribing to speakers cognition of truth theories. It's generally assumed on this approach that, however much context sensitivity speakers' languages contain, the cognized truththeories themselves can be adequately characterized context insensitively—that is, without using in the metalanguage expressions whose semantic value can vary across occasions of utterance. In this paper, I explore some of the motivations for and problems and consequences of dropping this assumption.
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DOI 10.1111/j.0268-1064.2005.00278.x
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References found in this work BETA
Intentionality.John Searle - 1983 - Oxford University Press.
Truth and Meaning.Donald Davidson - 2010 - In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Synthese. Routledge. pp. 304 - 323.

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On What is Effable.Delia Belleri - 2013 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (4):341-349.

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