Mind and Language 32 (3):358-391 (2017)

Authors
Jonathan Flombaum
Johns Hopkins University
Steven Gross
Johns Hopkins University
Abstract
Does perceptual consciousness require cognitive access? Ned Block argues that it does not. Central to his case are visual memory experiments that employ post-stimulus cueing—in particular, Sperling's classic partial report studies, change-detection work by Lamme and colleagues, and a recent paper by Bronfman and colleagues that exploits our perception of ‘gist’ properties. We argue contra Block that these experiments do not support his claim. Our reinterpretations differ from previous critics' in challenging as well a longstanding and common view of visual memory as involving declining capacity across a series of stores. We conclude by discussing the relation of probabilistic perceptual representations and phenomenal consciousness.
Keywords consciousness  perception  working memory  Bayesian models  Ned Block  cognitive access
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DOI 10.1111/mila.12144
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References found in this work BETA

On a Confusion About a Function of Consciousness.Ned Block - 1995 - Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.
A Treatise of Human Nature.David Hume & A. D. Lindsay - 1958 - Philosophical Quarterly 8 (33):379-380.
Seeing‐As in the Light of Vision Science.Ned Block - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (1):560-572.

View all 54 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Perceptual Pluralism.Jake Quilty‐Dunn - 2020 - Noûs 54 (4):807-838.
What Is an Object File?E. J. Green & Jake Quilty-Dunn - 2021 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 72 (3):665-699.
Representation in Cognitive Science: Replies.Nicholas Shea - 2020 - Mind and Language 35 (3):402-412.
If Perception is Probabilistic, Why Doesn't It Seem Probabilistic?Ned Block - 2018 - Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B 373 (1755).

View all 19 citations / Add more citations

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