In Steven Gross, Nicholas Tebben & Michael Williams (eds.), Meaning Without Representation: Essays on Truth, Expression, Normativity, and Naturalism. Oxford University Press. pp. 47-63 (2015)

Authors
Steven Gross
Johns Hopkins University
Abstract
Can one combine Davidsonian semantics with a deflationary conception of truth? Williams argues, contra a common worry, that Davidsonian semantics does not require truth-talk to play an explanatory role. Horisk replies that, in any event, the expressive role of truth-talk that Williams emphasizes disqualifies deflationary accounts—at least extant varieties—from combination with Davidsonian semantics. She argues, in particular, that this is so for Quine's disquotationalism, Horwich's minimalism, and Brandom's prosententialism. I argue that Horisk fails to establish her claim in all three cases. This involves clarifying Quine’s understanding of a purely referential occurrence; explaining how Davidsonians can avail themselves of a syntactic treatment of lexical ambiguity; and correcting a common misreading of Brandom (answering along the way an objection offered by Künne as well).
Keywords deflationism  Davidson  truth-theoretic semantics  truth  minimalism  prosententialism  Quine  Brandom  Horwich
Categories (categorize this paper)
Buy the book Find it on Amazon.com
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Making It Explicit.Isaac Levi & Robert B. Brandom - 1996 - Journal of Philosophy 93 (3):145.
Meaning.Paul Horwich - 1998 - Oxford University Press.
Conceptions of Truth.Wolfgang Künne - 2003 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

View all 38 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Solving the Problem of Creeping Minimalism.Matthew Simpson - 2018 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48 (3-4):510-531.
Deflationism and Truthmaking.Matthew Simpson - 2019 - Synthese 198 (4):3157-3181.
What is Global Expressivism?Matthew Simpson - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (278):140-161.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

The Expressive Role of Truth in Truth-Conditional Semantics.Claire Horisk - 2007 - Philosophical Quarterly 57 (229):535–557.
The Inconsistency of Deflationary Truth and Davidsonian Meaning.Kari Middleton - 2007 - The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 6:99-103.
Deflating Deflationism.Bradley Philip Armour-Garb - 1999 - Dissertation, City University of New York
Truth -- Meaning -- Reality.Paul Horwich - 2009 - Oxford University Press.
Mainstream Semantics + Deflationary Truth.Alexis Burgess - 2011 - Linguistics and Philosophy 34 (5):397-410.
Truth Theories, Translation Manuals, and Theories of Meaning.Jeff Speaks - 2006 - Linguistics and Philosophy 29 (4):487 - 505.
Horwich’s Sting: Constitution and Composition.John Collins - 2002 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 2 (2):213-228.
Explicating Truth: Minimalism and Primitivism. [REVIEW]Dirk Greimann - 2000 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 31 (1):133-155.
On Horwich's Way Out.Panu Raatikainen - 2005 - Analysis 65 (3):175-177.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2016-01-12

Total views
400 ( #21,980 of 2,454,519 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
48 ( #16,484 of 2,454,519 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes