Journal of Scottish Philosophy 4 (2):159-172 (2006)

Abstract
Contrary to the view that Francis Hutcheson attempted to expound, defend, and further develop the philosophical system described in Shaftesbury's Characteristics, some contemporaries of Hutcheson considered Hutcheson's differences from Shaftesbury to be at least as profound as the similarities. The clearest descriptions of those differences can be found in William Leechman's preface to Hutcheson's 1755 System of Moral Philosophy, and more elaborately in a review of Hutcheson's System, probably by Hugh Blair, published in the 1755 Edinburgh Review. Examining Shaftesbury's and Hutcheson's moral philosophies in light of these two descriptions reveals that Shaftesbury's defense of virtue as natural to human beings, while a plausible response to Locke, clearly did not escape Hutcheson's censure of Epicurean egoism
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DOI 10.3366/jsp.2006.4.2.159
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References found in this work BETA

On the Origins of "Aesthetic Disinterestedness".Jerome Stolnitz - 1961 - Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 20 (2):131-143.
A System of Moral Philosophy.Francis Hutcheson - 1755 - New York: A.M. Kelley.
An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections.Francis Hutcheson - 1742 - Gainesville, Fla., Scholars' Facsimiles & Reprints.

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Citations of this work BETA

Francis Hutcheson: Why Be Moral?Douglas R. Paletta - 2011 - Journal of Scottish Philosophy 9 (2):149-159.
Francis Hutcheson and the Heathen Moralists.Thomas Ahnert - 2010 - Journal of Scottish Philosophy 8 (1):51-62.

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